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Abstract 
 
Recent epidemics of highly contagious animal diseases included in the list A of the 
OIE such as foot-and-mouth disease, classical swine fever and avian influenza (AI) 
have led to the implementation of  stamping-out policies resulting in the depopulation 
of millions of animals. The enforcement of a control strategy based on culling of 
animals that are infected, suspected of being infected or suspected of being 
contaminated, which is based only on the application of sanitary restrictions on farms, 
may not be sufficient to avoid the spread of infection, particularly in areas that have 
high animal densities, thus resulting in mass depopulation.  
In the European Union, the directive that imposes the enforcement of a stamping-
out policy (92/40/EC) for AI was adopted in 1992 but was drafted in the 1980s. The 
poultry industry has undergone substantial changes in the last twenty years, mainly 
resulting in shorter production cycles and greater animal densities per territorial unit. 
Due to these organizational changes, infectious diseases are significantly more 
difficult to control as a result of the greater number of susceptible animals reared per 
given unit of time and the difficulties in applying adequate biosecurity measures. 
The slaughter and destruction of great numbers of animals is also questionable 
from an ethical point of view, particularly when human-health implications are 
negligible. For this reason, mass depopulation has raised serious concerns for the 
general public and  has recently led to very high costs and economic losses for the 
national and federal governments, the stakeholders and ultimately for the consumers.  
In the past, the use of vaccines in such emergencies has been limited by the 
impossibility of differentiating vaccinated/infected from vaccinated/non-infected 
animals. The major concern was that through trade or movement of apparently 
uninfected animals or products, the disease could spread further or might be exported 
to other countries. For this reason export bans have been imposed on countries 
enforcing a vaccination policy. 
This paper takes into account the possible strategies for the control of avian 
influenza infections, bearing in mind the new proposed definition of AI. In detail, an 
overview of the advantages and disadvantages of using conventional inactivated 
(homologous and heterologous) vaccines and recombinant vaccines is presented and 
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discussed. Reference is made to the different control strategies including the 
restriction measures to be applied in case of the enforcement of a vaccination policy. 
In addition, the implications of a vaccination policy on trade are discussed. 
In conclusion, if vaccination is accepted as an option for the control of AI, vaccine 
banks including companion diagnostic tests must be established and made available 
for immediate use. 
Keywords: avian influenza; vaccination; intervention strategies; poultry 
 
Introduction 
 
Recent epidemics of highly contagious animal diseases included in the list A of the 
Office International des Epizooties (OIE) such as foot-and-mouth disease, classical 
swine fever and avian influenza (AI) have led to the implementation of stamping-out 
policies resulting in a depopulation involving millions of animals. The 
implementation of a control strategy based on culling of animals that are infected, 
suspected of being infected or suspected of being contaminated, which is based only 
on the application of sanitary restrictions, may not be sufficient to avoid the spread of 
infection. This event is particularly foreseeable in areas that have high animal 
densities, and inevitably results in mass-depopulation policies. There is an increased 
risk of disease spread in these areas and the financial consequences of any occurring 
epidemic are severe (Capua and Marangon 2000; Dijkhuizen and Davies 1995; 
Gibbens et al. 2001; Meuwissen et al. 1999). 
With reference to AI, the EU directive that imposes the enforcement of a stamping-
out policy (92/40/EC) was adopted in 1992 but was drafted in the ’80’s (CEC 1992). 
The poultry industry has undergone substantial changes in the last twenty years, 
mainly resulting in shorter production cycles and in the development of densely 
populated poultry areas (DPPA). As a result of these organizational changes, 
infectious diseases are significantly more difficult to control due to the greater 
number of susceptible animals reared per given unit of time and to the difficulties in 
applying adequate biosecurity programmes. In order to avoid the destruction of great 
numbers of animals, the possibility of pursuing different control strategies should be 
considered. 
Until recent times highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) was considered a rare 
disease in domestic poultry with only 17 episodes being reported worldwide in the 40-
year period 1959-1998. However, three further outbreaks have occurred since 1999, 
resulting in 11 outbreaks since 1991 and six in the six years covering 1997-2003. 
Recently, there also appears to have been a marked increase in the number of low-
pathogenicity AI (LPAI) outbreaks caused by H5 and H7 viruses. The countries, 
subtypes and approximate number of birds involved are listed in Table 1. From 1997 
to date 14 significant outbreaks due to H5 or H7 subtypes have been reported in 
poultry, three of which have had human-health implications. The approximate number 
of birds culled for AI in the past 6 years has been 63 million, with hundreds of 
millions of birds involved (Capua and Alexander 2004). 
The slaughter and destruction of great numbers of animals is also questionable 
from an ethical point of view. For this reason, mass depopulation has raised serious 
concerns from the general public. The policy has also led to very high costs and 
economical losses for the Community budget, the Member States, the stakeholders 
and ultimately for the consumers. 
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Table 1. Outbreaks of LPAI and HPAI caused by H5 and H7 viruses in recent years 
 
Country Year[s] Subtype Virulence 
Approximate 
no. of birds 
infected/culled 
Control 
Mexico 
Guatemala, 
El Salvador 
1994-2003 
2000 
2001 
H5N2 LPAI/HPAI >1.000,000,000  Vaccination 
Pennsylvania 1996-1998 H7N2 LPAI 2,623,116 Depopulation 
Australia 1997 H7N4 HPAI 310,565 Stamping out 
Hong Kong 1997-2003 H5N1 HPAI ~3,000,000 Stamping out Vaccination 
Italy 1997 H5N2 HPAI 7741 Stamping out 
Ireland 1998 H7N7 LPAI 320,000 Depopulation 
N. Ireland 1998 H7N7 LPAI ? Depopulation 
Italy 1998 H5N9 LPAI 2,000 Stamping out 
Belgium 1999 H5N2 LPAI 100 Stamping out 
Italy 1999-2001 H7N1 
LPAI 
HPAI 
LPAI 
17,000,000 
Stamping out 
Vaccination + 
stamping out 
Germany 2001 H7N7 LPAI 145 Stamping out 
Pakistan 2001 H7N3 HPAI/LPAI >10,000,000? Vaccination 
USA 
(NC/VA) 2002 H7N2 LPAI ~5,000,000 Stamping out 
Chile 2002 H7N3 LPAI/HPAI ~1,000,000 Stamping out 
Italy 2002-2003 H7N3 LPAI >6,000,000 Vaccination + stamping out 
The  
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Germany 
2003 H7N7 HPAI 
 
30,283,000 
2,700,000 
419,000 
Stamping out 
USA (CT) 2003 H7N2 LPAI 2,900,000 Vaccination 
 
In the EU, the possibility of vaccinating to aid control policies in such emergencies 
has been limited by the inability to differentiate vaccinated–infected from vaccinated–
non-infected animals. The major concern was that through trade or movement of 
vaccinated animals or their products, the disease could spread further or might be 
exported to other countries, primarily because it was not possible to establish whether 
the vaccinated animals had been field-exposed. 
The following paper takes into account the recent developments in vaccinology, 
which may represent valid tools for the control of avian-influenza infections, bearing 
in mind the new definition of AI proposed by the EU (Document 
Sanco/B3/AH/R17/2000) and by the OIE (ad hoc expert group on Avian Influenza, 
Animal Health Code Commission meeting of 29-30 October 2002) and the possibility 
of enforcing an emergency vaccination programme with the products currently 
available. Reference will be made to the type of vaccines available, the efficacy of 
these vaccines, their limitations and the possibility of identifying infected animals in a 
vaccinated population. 
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Definition of avian influenza 
Avian influenza viruses all belong to the Influenzavirus A genus of the 
Orthomyxoviridae family and are negative-stranded, segmented RNA viruses. The 
influenza-A viruses can be divided into 15 subtypes on the basis of the 
haemagglutinin (H) antigens. In addition to the H antigen, influenza viruses possess 
one of nine neuraminidase (N) antigens. Virtually all H and N combinations have 
been isolated from birds, thus indicating the extreme antigenic variability that is a 
hallmark of these viruses. Changes in the H and N composition of a virus may be 
brought about by genetic reassortment in host cells. One of the consequences of 
genomic segmentation is that if co-infection by different viruses occurs in the same 
cell, progeny viruses may originate from the reassortment of parental genes 
originating from different viruses. Thus, since the influenza-A virus genome consists 
of 8 segments, from two parental viruses 256 different combinations of progeny 
viruses may arise theoretically. 
Current EU legislation (CEC 1992) defines avian influenza as “an infection of 
poultry caused by any influenza-A virus which has an intravenous pathogenicity 
index in six-week-old chickens greater than 1.2 or any infection with influenza-A 
viruses of H5 or H7 subtype for which nucleotide sequencing has demonstrated the 
presence of multiple basic amino acids at the cleavage site of the haemagglutinin”. 
However it has been proved that highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses 
emerge in domestic poultry from low-pathogenicity (LPAI) progenitors of the H5 and 
H7 subtypes. It therefore seems logical that HPAI viruses and their LPAI progenitors 
must be controlled, when they are introduced in domestic poultry populations 
(Scientific Committee on Animal Health and Animal Welfare 2000). The new 
proposed definition of AI for the OIE and the EU (Scientific Committee on Animal 
Health and Animal Welfare 2000) is “an infection of poultry caused by either any 
influenza A virus which has an intravenous pathogenicity index in 6-week-old 
chickens greater than 1.2 or any influenza A virus of H5 or H7 subtype”. With 
reference to the present paper, the term avian influenza applies to all avian influenza 
viruses of the H5 and H7 subtype, regardless of their virulence and of their 
pathogenicity for domestic poultry. 
 
Rationale behind the use of vaccines 
 
When an outbreak of avian influenza occurs in an area with a high population 
density, the application of rigorous biosecurity measures might not be possible. In this 
case the disease may spread very rapidly, and the tracing and culling capacities might 
not be adequate. This results in enormous efforts being spent on chasing the disease 
rather than on actively imposing a barrier to its spread. The only additional measure 
that can be taken to attempt to reduce disease spread is vaccination. The expected 
results of the implementation of a vaccination policy on the dynamics of infection are 
primarily those of reducing the susceptibility to infection (i.e. a higher dose of virus is 
necessary for establishing productive infection) and reducing the amount of virus shed 
into the environment. The association between a higher infective dose necessary to 
establish infection and less virus contaminating the environment represents a valuable 
support to the eradication of infection. 
The efficacy of an emergency vaccination programme is inversely correlated with 
the time span between the diagnosis in the index case and the implementation of mass 
vaccination. For this reason, it is imperative that if emergency vaccination is 
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considered as a possible option in a given country, vaccine banks must be available in 
the framework of national contingency plans. 
It should be clear that vaccination can be used for a variety of different scopes. It 
can be used to protect birds and reduce spread in case an HPAI epidemic is out of 
control and there is the risk of spread to other DPPAs. When there is no more 
evidence of virus circulation the vaccinated birds can be culled or dealt with 
appropriately. It can also be used to support eradication measures for LPAI in a 
DPPA. This is a longer-term strategy, which may also imply trade of commodities, 
provided they come from vaccinated animals that have not been field-exposed. 
 
Currently available vaccines 
 
Conventional vaccines 
Inactivated homologous vaccines 
These vaccines were originally prepared as ‘autogenous’ vaccines, i.e., vaccines 
that contain the same avian-influenza strain as the one causing the problems in the 
field. They have been used extensively in Mexico and Pakistan during the AI 
epidemics (Swayne and Suarez 2000). 
The efficacy of these vaccines in preventing clinical disease and in reducing the 
amount of virus shed in the environment has been proven through field evidence and 
experimental trials (Swayne and Suarez 2000). The disadvantage of this system is the 
impossibility of differentiating vaccinated from field-exposed birds unless 
unvaccinated sentinels are kept in the shed. However, the management (identification, 
bleeding and swabbing) of sentinel birds during a vaccination campaign is time-
consuming and rather complicated since they are difficult to identify, and they may be 
substituted with seronegative birds in the attempt to escape restrictions imposed by 
public health officials. 
 
Inactivated heterologous vaccines 
These vaccines are manufactured in a similar way to the previous ones. They differ 
in the fact that the virus strain used in the vaccine is of the same H type as the field 
virus but has a heterologous neuraminidase. Following field exposure, clinical 
protection and reduction of viral shedding are ensured by the immune reaction 
induced by the homologous H group while antibodies against the neuraminidase 
induced by the field virus can be used as a marker of natural infection (Capua and 
Marangon 2000). 
For both homologous and heterologous vaccines, the degree of clinical protection 
and the reduction of shedding are improved by a higher antigen mass in the vaccine 
(Swayne et al. 1999). For heterologous vaccines the degree of protection is not strictly 
correlated to the degree of homology between the haemagglutinin genes of the 
vaccine and challenge strains (Swayne and Suarez 2000). This is definitely a great 
advantage because it enables the establishment of vaccine banks since the master seed 
does not contain the virus that is present in the field and may contain an isolate 
(preferably of the same lineage) available before the epidemic. 
 
Recombinant vaccines 
Several recombinant fowlpox virus expressing the H5 antigen have been developed 
(Beard, Schnitzlein and Tripathy 1992; Beard, Schnitzlein and Tripathy 1991; 
Swayne et al. 2000; Swayne, Beck and Mickle 1997; Webster et al. 1996) and one has 
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been licensed and is currently being used in Mexico (Swayne and Suarez 2000). 
Experimental data have also been obtained for fowlpox-virus recombinants 
expressing the H7 antigen (Boyle, Selleck and Heine 2000). Other vectors have been 
used to deliver successfully the H5 or H7 antigens such as constructs using infectious 
laryngotracheitis virus (ILTV) (Lüschow et al. 2001). 
The only field experience with a recombinant virus to control AI has been obtained 
in Mexico (Villareal-Chavez and Rivera Cruz 2003), where it has been used in the 
vaccination campaign against an LPAI H5N2 virus. 
No such product has been licensed in the EU to date. 
 
Trade implications 
 
Until recent times, vaccination against avian influenza viruses of the H5 and H7 
subtypes, was not considered or practised in developed countries since it implied 
export bans on live poultry and on poultry products (CEC 1994). In case of an 
infection with an H5 or H7 virus, regardless of the virulence of the isolate, export 
bans have also been imposed. Export bans frequently represent the major cause of 
economic loss due to OIE List A diseases. 
Whilst the severe clinical signs caused by HPAI ensure a prompt diagnosis and 
facilitate the implementation of a stamping-out policy, the inconspicuous nature of the 
disease caused by viruses of low pathogenicity make this infection difficult to 
diagnose. Detection of infection is only possible with the implementation of 
appropriate surveillance programmes. Bearing in mind the new proposed definition of 
AI, and the potential mutation of LPAI of the H5 and H7 subtypes to HPAI it is easy 
to understand why these bans have been imposed. For the sake of trade, freedom from 
AI should be demonstrated in a given country or compartment by ongoing 
surveillance programmes. This approach is supported by the fact that in several recent 
outbreaks, infection with a virus of low pathogenicity was only detected once 
infection was widespread, and often out of control. 
In absence of vaccination, trade bans imposed on a given area last until freedom 
from infection can be demonstrated in the affected population. In the case of the 
adoption of a vaccination policy that does not enable the application of a ‘DIVA’ 
(differentiating infected from vaccinated animals) strategy (either for the type of 
vaccine used or because the monitoring system in place does not guarantee that 
infection is no longer circulating) this also results in prolonged trade bans. On the 
contrary, if it is possible to demonstrate that the infection is not circulating in the 
vaccinated population trade bans may be lifted. 
Such ‘marker’ vaccination strategies offer attractive control options for OIE List-A 
diseases. In case of an outbreak of avian influenza in a DPPA the option of 
vaccinating should be pursued. To safeguard international trade a control strategy that 
enables the differentiation between vaccinated–infected and vaccinated–non-infected 
animals should be implemented. The possibility of using vaccines would support 
restriction-based control measures, thus reducing the risk of a major epidemic and the 
subsequent mass stamping-out policy. 
 
Options for control 
 
It is extremely difficult to establish fixed rules for the control of infectious diseases 
in animal populations, due to the unpredictable number of variables involved. 
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However, with reference to AI, some basic scenarios may be hypothesized, and on the 
basis of the considerations made above some guidelines may be drawn, which are 
reported in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Guidelines for the application of control policies for AI 
 
H5/H7 virus 
pathogenicity 
Index case 
flock 
Evidence of 
spread to 
industrial circuit 
Population density 
in area Policy 
HPAI/LPAI Backyard No High/Low Stamping out 
Low Stamping out 
HPAI/LPAI Backyard Yes 
High Vaccination 
HPAI/LPAI Industrial No High/Low Stamping out 
Low Stamping out 
HPAI/LPAI Industrial Yes 
High Vaccination 
 
There are several crucial steps that must be planned for if avian influenza 
represents a risk. Firstly the index case must be promptly identified. This should not 
represent a problem if the virus is of high pathogenicity, but it can be a serious 
concern if the virus if of low pathogenicity. For this reason countries or areas at risk 
of infection should implement specific surveillance systems to detect infection with 
LPAI as soon as it appears. 
Secondly, a timely assessment must be performed of whether there has been spread 
to the industrial poultry population of that area. This is a crucial evaluation, which 
must be made available for decision-makers. 
Once an AI outbreak has been identified eradication measures based on the 
stamping out or controlled marketing of slaughter birds on infected farms must be 
enforced. The choice between these two options must be taken bearing in mind the 
pathogenicity and transmissibility of the virus, the density of poultry farms around the 
affected premises, the economical value of the affected birds, the logistics for 
slaughter/stamping out and the collaborative approach of farmers/producers. With 
reference to the Italian experience a stamping-out policy was generally applied to 
LPAI-infected young meat birds, breeders and layers, while controlled marketing was 
applied for older meat birds approaching slaughter age. This strategy enables the 
reduction of the restriction periods (i.e. if infected young turkeys, breeders or layers 
were kept on the farms the restriction period could last several months) and hence 
facilitates faster restocking. 
In addition, restriction measures on the movement of live poultry, vehicles and 
staff must be imposed in the areas at risk. 
Finally, if vaccination is the proposed strategy, vaccine banks should be available 
for immediate use and a contingency plan must be enforced. A territorial strategy 
must be implemented. It must include restriction measures (Tables 3 and 4) and an 
ongoing set of adequate controls (Figure 1) that enable public authorities to establish 
whether the virus is circulating or not in the vaccinated population and assess the 
efficacy of the vaccination programme. 
Table 3. Basic restriction and monitoring measures to be enforced on the movements of live poultry and poultry products originating from and/or 
destined for farms or plants located in the vaccination area (VA) 
 
Commodity Restrictions to movements towards the VA Restrictions to movements inside the VA Restrictions to movements outside the VA 
Hatching 
eggs 
- shall be transported directly to the hatchery of 
destination 
- (and their packaging) must be disinfected before 
dispatch 
- tracing-back of egg lots in the hatchery shall be 
guaranteed 
- must originate from a vaccinated or unvaccinated 
breeding flock that has been tested, with negative 
results, according to Table 4 
- shall be transported directly to the hatchery of 
destination 
- (and their packaging) must be disinfected before 
dispatch 
- tracing-back of egg lots in the hatchery shall be 
guaranteed 
- must originate from a vaccinated or unvaccinated 
breeding flock that has been tested, with negative 
results, according to Table 4 
- shall be transported directly to the hatchery of 
destination 
- (and their packaging) must be disinfected before 
dispatch 
- tracing-back of egg lots in the hatchery shall be 
guaranteed 
Day-old 
chicks 
must be destined for a poultry-house where: 
- no poultry is kept 
- cleansing and disinfection operations have been 
carried out 
- must originate from hatching eggs satisfying the 
conditions mentioned above 
- must be destined for a poultry house where no 
poultry is kept and where cleansing and 
disinfection operations have been carried out 
- must originate from hatching eggs satisfying the 
conditions mentioned above 
- must be destined for a poultry house where no 
poultry is kept and where cleansing and 
disinfection operations have been carried out 
Ready-to-
lay pullets 
must be: 
- housed in a poultry house where no poultry has 
been kept for at least 3 weeks, and cleansing/ 
disinfection operations have been carried out 
- vaccinated at the farm of destination 
must: 
- have been vaccinated regularly against avian 
influenza 
- have been tested, with negative results, according 
to Table 4 
- be destined for a farm located in the VA and 
housed in a poultry house where no poultry has 
been kept for at least 3 weeks, and 
cleansing/disinfection operations have been carried 
out 
- be officially inspected within 24 hours before 
loading 
- be virologically and serologically tested with 
negative results before loading (sentinel birds) 
must: 
- not have been vaccinated 
- have been tested, with negative results, according 
to Table 4 
- be destined for a poultry house where no poultry 
has been kept for at least 3 weeks, and cleansing/ 
disinfection operations have been carried out 
- be officially inspected within 24 hours before 
loading 
- be virologically and serologically tested with 
negative results before loading 
 
 
   
Commodity Restrictions to movements towards the VA Restrictions to movements inside the VA Restrictions to movements outwards the VA 
Poultry for 
slaughter 
- must be sent directly to the abattoir for immediate 
slaughter 
- must be transported by lorries that operate, on the 
same day, only on farms located outside the VA 
- lorries must be washed and disinfected under 
official control before and after each transport 
 
- shall undergo a clinical inspection within 48 
hours before loading 
- must be directly sent to the abattoir for immediate 
slaughter 
- must be serologically tested before loading  
- the abattoir must guarantee that accurate washing 
and disinfection operations are carried out under 
official supervision 
- shall be transported by lorries that operate, on the 
same day, only on farms located inside the VA 
- lorries must be washed and disinfected before 
and after each transport 
- shall undergo a clinical inspection within 48 
hours before loading 
- must be sent directly to an abattoir designated by 
the competent veterinary authority for immediate 
slaughter 
- must be serologically tested before loading 
- the abattoir must guarantee that accurate washing 
and disinfection operations are carried out under 
official supervision 
- shall be transported by lorries that operate, on the 
same day, only on farms located inside the VA 
- lorries must be washed and disinfected before 
and after each transport 
Table eggs must be: 
- sent directly to a packaging centre or a thermal-
treatment plant designated by the competent 
authority 
- transported using disposable packaging materials 
that can be effectively washed and disinfected 
must: 
- originate from a flock that has been tested, with 
negative results, as laid down in Table 4 
- be sent directly to a packaging centre or a 
thermal-treatment plant designated by the 
competent authority 
- be transported using disposable packaging 
material or packaging material that can be 
effectively washed and disinfected 
must: 
- originate from a flock that has been tested, with 
negative results, as laid down in Table 4 
- be sent directly to a packaging centre or a 
thermal-treatment plant designated by the 
competent authorities 
- be transported using disposable packaging 
material or packaging material that can be 
effectively washed and disinfected 
 
Table 4. Basic restrictions to be applied to the trade of fresh meat produced from poultry originating from the vaccination area (VA) 
 
Commodity Unrestricted to international trade Restricted to national trade 
Fresh poultry 
meat 
- originating from birds vaccinated against avian influenza with a 
heterologous subtype vaccine can be dispatched to other countries, 
provided that the meat comes from slaughter-turkey flocks that: 
 
(i) have been regularly inspected and tested with negative results for 
avian influenza as follows. 
For the testing of: 
— vaccinated animals, the anti-N discriminatory test shall be used 
— sentinel animals, either the haemagglutination-inhibition test (HI), 
the AGID test or the ELISA test shall be used. However, anti-N 
discriminatory test shall also be used if necessary 
 
(ii) have been clinically inspected by an official veterinarian within 48 
hours before loading. Sentinel animals shall be inspected with particular 
attention 
 
(iii) have been serologically tested with negative results with the iIFA 
test 
 
(iv) must be sent directly to a slaughterhouse designated by the 
competent authority and be slaughtered immediately on arrival 
 
- produced from poultry not vaccinated against avian influenza and 
originating from the VA 
originating from holdings located in the VA cannot be 
dispatched to other countries, if produced from poultry: 
 
(i) vaccinated against avian influenza with a homologous 
subtype vaccine 
 
(ii) vaccinated against avian influenza with a heterologous 
subtype vaccine and not tested, with negative results, using the 
anti-N discriminatory test 
 
(iii) originating from seropositive poultry flocks subjected to 
controlled marketing 
 
(iv) coming from poultry holdings located in the restriction zone 
(minimum 3 km radius) that must be established around any 
LPAI-infected farms for at least two weeks 
 
 
Figure 1. Monitoring measures to be applied in the vaccination area 
MONITORING MEASURES IN THE VACCINATION AREA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MONITORING VACCINE EFFICACY   MONITORING EPIDEMIOLOGICAL SITUATION (ALL FARMS) 
 
 
 
 
• 30 vaccinated farms      ⇒Every 30-45 days 
• HI test         ⇒Serological 
• 20 vaccinated birds/farm/month     ⇒10 sentinel animals/farm 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
¾ Monthly    ⇒Every 2 months  ♦All groups at slaughter  ♣ Every 45 days 
¾ Serological    ⇒Virological   ♦Serological    ♣Serological 
¾ 10 subjects /farm   ⇒30 cloacal swabs  ♦10 samples    ♣10-20 samples/farm 
   (before loading for slaughter) ♣Virological
VACCINATED FARMS 
Breeders 
Commercial layers 
Geese 
Ducks 
Ostriches 
Unvaccinated poultry 
farms 
Growers 
Dealers 
UNVACCINATED FARMS : MONITORING HEALTH SITUATION (all farms) 
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Applications in the field 
 
Conventional vaccines 
Inactivated homologous vaccines 
These products have recently been used in the attempt to control avian-influenza 
infections in Pakistan and Mexico (Swayne and Suarez 2000), but under those 
specific conditions they have not been successful in eradicating the infection. 
Conversely, in one instance, in Utah (Frame et al. 1996), the use of this vaccination 
strategy has been successful. The reason for the discrepancy of the results probably 
lies in the efficacy of the direct control measures, which must be implemented to 
support a vaccination campaign. 
Inactivated heterologous vaccines 
This vaccination strategy has been used successfully over the years in Minnesota 
(Halvorson 2002); however, in these instances vaccination was never implemented to 
control infections caused by viruses of the H5 or H7 subtypes. In addition the 
heterologous neuraminidase was not used as a marker of infection. 
Conversely, in Italy during 2000-2002 this strategy was used to supplement control 
measures for the eradication of the H7N1 LPAI virus (CEC 2000). In order to control 
the re-emergence of LPAI virus and to develop a novel control strategy, a co-
ordinated set of measures, including strict biosecurity, a serologic monitoring 
programme and a ‘DIVA’ strategy were enforced (Commission Decision 
2001/721/CE as amended). The ‘DIVA’ strategy was based on the use of an oil-
emulsion-based inactivated vaccine with the same haemagglutinin and a heterologous 
neuraminidase (N) subtype from the field virus, in this case an H7N3 strain.  
The possibility of using the diverse N groups to differentiate between vaccinated 
and naturally infected birds, was achieved through the development of an ad hoc 
serological test to detect the specific anti-N1 antibodies (Capua et al. 2003). 
Control of the field situation was achieved through an intensive sero-surveillance 
programme aimed at the detection of the LPAI virus through the regular testing of 
sentinel birds in vaccinated flocks and through the application of the anti-N1-antibody 
detection test. Serological monitoring was also enforced in unvaccinated flocks, 
located both inside and outside the vaccination area. In addition, the efficacy of the 
vaccination schemes was evaluated in the field through regular serological testing of 
selected flocks. 
After the first year of vaccination, the epidemiological data collected indicated that 
the H7N1 virus was not circulating. This was considered sufficient by the EU 
Commission to lift the marketing restrictions on fresh meat obtained from vaccinated 
poultry provided that animals had been tested with negative results using the 
discriminatory test (Commission Decision 2001/847/CE) (CEC 2001). 
It is clear that due to the unpredictable nature of the epidemiology of this disease, 
which could result in the introduction of other avian-influenza subtypes, this solution 
is to be considered ‘tailored’ for a given epidemic. 
 
Recombinant vaccines 
The only field experience with these vaccines has been obtained in Mexico, where 
it has been used in the vaccination campaign against the H5N2 virus. Avian influenza 
has not been eradicated in Mexico, probably because an eradication programme based 
on a territorial strategy and including monitoring and restriction was not established. 
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Recombinant live vectored vaccines also enable the differentiation between 
infected and vaccinated birds, since they do not induce the production of antibodies 
against the nucleoprotein antigen, which is common to all AI viruses. Therefore, only 
field-infected birds will exhibit antibodies to the AGP or ELISA test directed towards 
the detection of group A (nucleoprotein) antibodies. 
Since these vaccines have encountered some difficulties in licensing, their use is 
restricted to countries in which they are legally available. In addition, these vaccines 
will not replicate, and induce protective immunity, in birds that have had field 
exposure to the vector (i.e. fowlpox or infectious laryngotracheitis viruses) (Lüschow 
et al. 2001; Swayne, Beck and Kinney 2000). Since serological positivity to these 
viruses is widespread (due to field exposure and vaccination) in the poultry 
population, and can be in some instances unpredictable, the use of these vaccines is 
limited to a population which is seronegative to the vector virus. In addition, the use 
of these vaccines is restricted to species in which the vector virus will replicate. For 
example, ILTV will not replicate in turkeys, and since these birds are particularly 
important in the epidemiology of AI, the use of this vaccine is limited to areas in 
which turkeys are not present.  
 
Discussion 
 
From the data presented it appears that emergency vaccination is a sensible option 
if there is evidence of the introduction of a highly transmissible AI virus in a densely 
populated poultry area, or whenever the epidemiological situation indicates that there 
could be massive and rapid spread of infection. In addition, emergency vaccination 
should be considered where applicable, when birds of high economic value (e.g. 
pedigree flocks) or rare (endangered) birds are at risk of infection. It is clear that 
vaccination represents a tool to support eradication, and will be a successful tool only 
if coupled with restriction and increased biosecurity. 
Considering the advantages and disadvantages of the products and diagnostic tools 
taht are currently available, if no recombinant products are licensed in that country, 
heterologous vaccination rather than homologous vaccination should be practiced in 
case of an emergency. The main reason for this would be that it would enable the 
differentiation between vaccinated and naturally exposed birds, through the 
development/application of an appropriate test. At present only the anti-
neuraminidase-based test is available and has been validated. In our opinion however, 
this test represents a starting point on which future developments of the ‘DIVA’ 
strategy can be based. The development of novel candidate vaccines and of additional 
tests that enable the detection of field infection in vaccinated populations should be a 
priority for pharmaceutical industries and for research institutions, since for all the 
reasons listed above vaccination is already an option for the control of avian 
influenza.  
If the country has access to licensed recombinant products, the use of these 
vaccines is acceptable taking into consideration the immune status of the population 
against the vector, since seropositivity impedes the replication of the vector virus and 
therefore the establishment of immunity. The issue of the replicating capacity of the 
vector in different species must also be addressed. 
In conclusion, recent events including devastating epidemics in densely populated 
poultry areas, public-health concerns on animal-welfare issues and the introduction of 
novel technology into vaccinology have encouraged consideration of alternative 
Chapter 8 
72 
control strategies for OIE List-A diseases which were unthinkable of only a few years 
ago. This has also been supported by the development of reliable, sensitive and 
specific diagnostic companion tests. Countries, areas and enterprises at risk of 
infection should imperatively enforce surveillance programmes and have contingency 
plans in case of a disease outbreak, which may include vaccination. If the latter is 
considered an option, among other issues, the contingency plan must foresee the 
establishment of licensed vaccine banks that enable the ‘DIVA’ strategy, thus 
safeguarding animal health, animal welfare and international trade. 
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